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examined in detail the chieftaincy succession system in the Bulsa Traditional area of Ghana, both conflict
and consensus, and how this has helped over the years to maintain peace and avoid violence. The paper
also examines whether this case could be a model for chieftaincy succession in Ghana.
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A Concomitant of Conflict and Consensus:
Case of the Buluk Chieftaincy Succession in Ghana
Kaderi Noagah Bukari
Despite the fact that Ghana has remained relatively peaceful in the midst of a turbulent
sub-region and has not had civil war of any sort, there are many violent chieftaincy succession
conflicts dotted across the country (although there have been five coups where constitutions were
suspended, none of these degenerated into a civil war). The conflicts are intertwined with interand intra-ethnic conflicts that mainly revolve around the quest for traditional power
(chieftaincy). Hardly a region in Ghana is without chieftaincy dispute. Some of these conflicts
occasionally flare up into violence with deaths and destruction of property. The Dagbon,
Bimbilla, Bawku, Winneba, and Ga conflicts are all due to chieftaincy – disputing claims to
traditional political power. Even the most devastating conflict in the history of Ghana between
the Konkomba and Nanumba/Dagomba in 1994/1995 (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Mahama, 2003),
which claimed over 2000 lives, resulted principally from the quest of the Konkomba to have
their own chiefs. The Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture as of May 2010 had a record of 232
reported chieftaincy disputes in Ghana. Abotchie (2006) states that 600 land disputes in Ghana
are mainly dominated by chieftaincy disputes. Reasons for chieftaincy conflicts include disputes
over rightful succession to stools or skins, control over stool lands and land litigation, political
interference, inordinate ambition for power and the lack of accountability and transparency by
some traditional rulers (Prah &Yeboah, 2011). The use of the terms “stool” and “skin”
represents the symbols of authority of chiefs in the southern and Northern parts of Ghana
respectively.
Chieftaincy has been the most resilient Ghanaian tradition to have survived blatant
interference and destruction from both colonial and post-colonial governments (Boafo-Arthur,
2006). Chieftaincy remains at the heart of Ghanaian traditions and continues to provide
leadership for many people across Ghana. Its establishment predates colonialism. Many of the
chiefly/centralized ethnic groups such as the Akan, Ga, Ewe, Mamprusi, Dagomba, and Gonja
migrated with elaborate chieftaincy systems to Ghana. Even the originally acephalous or nonchiefly ethnic groups in northern Ghana such as the Konkomba, Bimoba, Bulsa, Kusasi, Talensi,
and Grunsi all now practice chieftaincy. Thus chieftaincy is very significant in the lives of many
ethnic groups and Ghanaians in general. Some of the chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana have roots

in colonialism. The colonial masters in their quest to entrench their rule in Africa established
administrative structures that forced many ethnic groups and traditional structures, including
chieftaincy, into “cohesive” structures destroying the roots of these traditional structures
(Awedoba, 2009). This has resulted in lingering conflicts in many parts of Ghana. Indirect rule,
for example, stampeded some traditional areas and merged some ethnic groups in northern
Ghana into other ethnic groups to rule them.
Many of the acephalous groups in northern Ghana were forced to come under the rule of
the chiefly Mumprusi, Dogomba, Gonja, and Nanumba groups. This resulted in conflicts
between some of these acephalous ethnic groups and their chiefly masters after Ghana gained
independence, when they (the acephalous) requested to rule themselves. For instance, it is the
quest of the Kusasis to rule themselves that has sparked the lingering conflict between them and
the Mamprusis. It is the same factor that triggered the Komkonba and Dagomba/Namumba in
1994/1995. Democratic traditional institutions, especially consensus based decision-making, are
important for the resolution of conflicts and building strong institutions. Democratic practices in
chieftaincy succession and practice already existed in Ghana and in many other indigenous
African groups before European colonialists introduced direct western majoritarian democracy
(Graeber, 2004). Chiefs, for instance, ruled their areas with a council of elders who advised
them as well as helped to make laws and pass judgments.
The Bulsa, who administratively occupy two districts (Bulsa North and Bulsa South
Districts) in the Upper East of Ghana, according to oral narrations, descended from the
Mamprugu Kingdom. Sandema became the most important town and the paramountcy (a
derived noun form of the adjective ‘paramount’ and refers to the topmost chief of an area)
following the ability of Sandema to mobilize the others in the area in defending and protecting
the whole kingdom, especially from slave raiders. Reigning over important towns like Wiaga,
Siniesi, Doninga, Kanjaga, Kadema, Gbedema, Uasi, Fumbisi, Bachansi, Chuchuliga, and
Gbedemblisi, the Sandem Naab (Naab is title for a chief among the Bulsa) is the paramount chief
with traditional and executive powers of installing chiefs for these towns. Rattray (1932) in his
seminal work, Tribes of Ashanti Hinterland, described the Bulsa as one of the acephelous groups
in northern Ghana, with skillful organizational ability. Unlike other acephelous groups such as
the Kusasi and Konkomba and their former “masters,” the Bulsa Traditional Area has remained
relatively peaceful with a very stable and powerful chieftaincy system that has existed for more

than a century. The ascension of Ayieta Azantinlow to the Buluk paramountcy in 1931, and his
subsequent reign for seventy five years, helped to make the area peaceful and stable with the
only chieftaincy dispute in Chuchuliga in 1995 following the refusal of Francis Asangalisa to
come to Sandema for his installation as a new chief, claiming the rightful kingmakers are in
Chuchuliga and not the Sandem Naab, Ayieta Azantinlow (Awedoba, 2009).
Indeed, conflicts have arisen over chieftaincy succession in the area predating Ayieta
Azantilow. Even his installment was marred by disputes to his throne from his brother,
Amaama. Following the death of Ayieta Azantilow in 2006, a dispute arose between the Afoko
family and the Azantilow family mainly over traditional issues as to who has the right to perform
some traditional duties and over the rightful succession procedure. Another dispute arose
following the enskinment in 2012 of Azagsuk Azantilow between himself and Sylvester Atiteng
Azantilow as to who really won the contest for the chieftaincy. The mode of selecting a chief in
the Bulsa traditional area follows “who has the majority” of heads of house owners (Yeri-nyam).
The system is run such that the electorates (Yeri-nyam) stand by the candidate of their choice and
the candidate with the majority of Yeri-nyam is declared the winner. Candidates must be from
the royal family of Abil-yeri and their lineage must have at least been a chief. Despite the clarity
in the election of chiefs, the system is sometimes fraught with disputes arising from procedural
issues and disagreement over the legitimacy of the electorate (Yeri-nyam). This was the case of
the recent dispute in 2012 when Sylvester Atiteng Azantilow challenged the election of Azagsuk
Azantilow, claiming there were disparities in the numbers who voted for Azagsuk Azantilow.
Sylvester Atiteng Azantilow subsequently went to court to challenge the legitimacy of Azagsuk’s
election.
In spite of the conflicts arising from the selection and installation of chiefs in the Bulsa
Area, the conflicts hardly degenerate into full-scale violence and the disputants quickly resolve
the conflicts and come together. Thus in the end, consensus is built among the groups including
the minority who refuse to accept the “election” and there is no state apparatus with coercive
force to compel the minority to agree with the decisions of the majority as exists in western
majoritarian rule (Graeber, 2004). In Naab Ayieta Azantilow’s case, the opponent Amaama
dropped his challenge to allow for peace. Again, Sylvester Atiteng Azantilow withdrew his law
suits and recognized Azagsuk Azantilow as chief which subsequently led to Azagsuk
Azantilow’s recognition by all in 2013. Therefore, the claim of the people of the area has been

that the system of succession and installing a chief is peaceful, democratic and is consensus
based decision-making, asserted as “we fight but in the end we come together.” Thus, this paper
looks at the whole process of chieftaincy succession in the Bulsa Traditional Area (Buluk),
examining conflict and consensus and its peaceful nature as well as its implication, application
and prospects for resolving chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana. The paper seeks to answer these
questions: what is it that makes the chieftaincy succession in Buluk unique and what lessons does
it hold for peace and stability in other succession disputes in Ghana?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, the concepts of
conflict and consensus are explained and theorized; section three presents the methodology and
study area; section four discusses the history of chieftaincy in Ghana and an overview of
chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana; the empirical results and discussions are examined in section five,
and section six draws a conclusion for the paper.
Theorizing Conflict and Consensus
Conflict occurs when two or more parties pursue incompatible interests or goals through
actions that the parties try to undo or damage each other. The parties may be individuals, groups
or countries. The parties’ interests can differ over access to resources, the control of political or
traditional power, their identity and values or ideology. The realization of these needs and
interests by people can lead to conflict. The pursuit of incompatible interests and needs by
groups or individuals could lead them to engage in conflict that can be violent. In the case of
Buluk, conflict is often about who actually won the contest of the chieftaincy-the contest for
traditional power. Extractions from Weber’s conception of power are important for our
discussions here. Weber (2010) notes that the ability to possess power derives from the
individual's ability to control various “social resources.” In societies such as Buluk, power is
traditional, meaning chiefs derive their power from tradition and customs to have social
resources such as land and social respect. The power and “perks” associated with position of the
chief such as control over land, royalties and government/state recognition have often motivated
the contest for chieftaincy and thereby the conflicts. To Weber (2010), the distribution of power
between the typical groups of a community participating in this distribution is done through
“social order.” This social order is achieved thus through consensus-building.
Similarly, Graeber’s (2004) conceptualization of counter-power in societies such as that
of Buluk is worth noting. Graeber (2004) argues that counter-power:

…emerges from the fact that all social systems are a tangle of contradictions, always to
some degree at war with themselves. Or, more precisely, it is rooted in the relation
between the practical imagination required to maintain a society based on consensus (as
any society not based on violence must, ultimately, be) – the constant work of
imaginative identification with others that makes understanding possible – and the
spectral violence which appears to be its constant, perhaps inevitable corollary. (p.35)
Graeber thus emphasizes the contradiction of social systems whereby consensus-building is used
to counter violence and helps to maintain society. Basically, the Buluk chieftaincy system takes
this form as described by Graeber where the contestants engage in conflict, but the society is
maintained in the end through consensus. Consensus is generally about a compromise and
reaching an agreement. Consensus theory assumes that societies have an inherent tendency to
maintain themselves in a state of relative equilibrium through the mutually and supportive
interaction of their principal institutions (Larson & Wikström, 2001). To this end, Graeber &
Grubacic (2004) argue that the point of consensus process is to allow a group to decide on a
common course of action through a process of compromise and synthesis, until one ends up with
something with which everyone can live. Thus in a consensus, everyone agrees on an issue and
people work together to maintain society. Importantly, Log (2001) states that within social
systems (Log calls them social fields), “any order that does emerge is the result of struggles,
negotiations and accommodations that take place between competing parties” (p. 241).
Ghanaian chieftaincy systems in many spheres are hinged on consensus-based decision
making. Ghanaian traditional societies, especially Akan (Fanti and Asante) already, for instance,
had the democratic tenants in their traditional chieftaincy system including consensus-building
and consultation by the chief to rule. The selection of chiefs is done through consensus-building,
and the chief rules through the constitution (rules set by the society) of his people (CaselyHayford, 1903; Sarbah, 1906; Rattray, 1929; Danquah, 1961). The Asante chieftaincy system,
Rattray (1929) notes, had elaborate rules and code of conduct through which the chief must rule
his people, and these were binding on every chief. In effect, traditional chieftaincy systems were
consensus-based in nature.

Chieftaincy Succession in Ghana – Historical Perspectives
Chieftaincy has remained the most enduring Ghanaian traditional institution that has
existed for centuries. With a very turbulent history, it has survived all forms of manipulation,
interference and attempted destruction in Ghana’s history from colonial, post-colonial and
military governments. Many scholars who write on chieftaincy in Ghana argue that unlike other
African countries like Uganda, chieftaincy in Ghana has remained resilient and strong in the
midst of robust challenges and has never collapsed despite blatant attempts to destroy it (OwusuMensah, 2013; Brempong, 2006; Nukunya, 2003). The history of chieftaincy predates the
coming of European colonialists. Chiefs then managed the day to day administrative, political,
social, economic organization, and life of the societies and ethnic groups. Chieftaincy in precolonial Ghana was the main system of government and political organization. During the
colonial era, the British colonial administration, in a bid to consolidate its power, restructured
and integrated some aspects of chieftaincy to fit into the colonial administration (OwusuMensah, 2013). The introduction of indirect rule for instance curbed the powers of chiefs as
chiefs who opposed the British colonial powers were deposed for their favorites who supported
colonial policies. The British colonialists saw that ruling without the chiefs was impossible and
therefore included them in legislative councils and used them to enforce laws and collect taxes
from the people.
Chieftaincy suffered much uncertainty and interference in post-colonial Ghana.
Although constitutional provisions and acts have guaranteed and safeguarded the chieftaincy
institution in post-colonial era, the interference from post-colonial governments has been
immense. For example, Nkrumah (the first post-colonial president of Ghana) and his
Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government attempted to control the institution by intentionally
targeting chiefs who opposed his regime. Nkrumah enacted the Chieftaincy Amendment Act
which in effect gave power to the Minister of Local Government to recognize persons before
they were deemed chiefs. Some chiefs were disposed and new paramountcies were created by
the CPP government. Other governments equally interfered in the chieftaincy institutions.
Interestingly, the entrenchment of democratic rule and the expansion of state powers since the
return to civilian rule in 1992 have not lessoned the importance of the chieftaincy institution in
most parts of Ghana (Tonah, 2012). People in many parts of Ghana still look up to chieftaincy
for leadership, and support for the institution is strong throughout the country.

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana has clearly defined the identity of chief by outlining the
process of the enskinment and enstoolment (the process of being made a chief) in Ghana in
accordance with the customs of the said traditional area. In the definition of a chief, the 1992
Constitution of Ghana in Article 277 states that:
… ‘Chief’ means a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has
been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a
chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.
(Republic of Ghana, 1992)
The constitution also recognizes the customs of the area as very important in the selection of
chiefs. The 1992 Constitution again in Article 270 (3a and 3b) gives clear guidance in the
ascension of a person to a stool or skin of a particular traditional area. It reads:
(a) the determination, in accordance with the appropriate customary law and usage, by a
traditional council, a Regional House of Chiefs or a Chieftaincy Committee of any of
them, of the validity of the nomination, election, selection, installation or deposition of a
person as a chief;
(b) a traditional council or a Regional House of Chiefs or the National House of Chiefs to
establish and operate a procedure for the registration of chiefs and the public notification
in the Gazette or otherwise of the status of persons as chiefs in Ghana. (Republic of
Ghana, 1992)

Although the selection and the installation of chiefs for every traditional area are always
based on the customs of that area, candidates for the position of the chief must first come from
the royal family whose lineage by custom has the right to be chiefs and have been chiefs before.
The onus to select a person rests upon the kingmakers. Whilst there may be disputes regarding
the legitimacy of candidates to the occupancy of a stool or skin, disputes could also arise over the
legitimacy of the kingmakers. The kingmakers are people whose backgrounds are deeply rooted
in the traditions of the area. They (kingmakers) also inherit their powers to select and install
chiefs from their lineage who were once involved in that. The 1992 Constitution makes
provision for the establishment of Traditional Councils, Regional and National Houses of Chiefs
for the determination of the validity of the nomination, election, selection, installation, or
deposition of a person as a chief. Thus, when kingmakers select and install chiefs, their

recognition and acceptance as chiefs must be validated by the Traditional Councils, Regional,
and National Houses of Chiefs.
Chieftaincy Conflicts in Ghana
Conflict theorists have always seen conflicts as inevitable in human existence and so is
the quest for traditional power in Ghana. Chieftaincy conflicts occur when two or more
parties/candidates whose quest to rule over a traditional area is fraught with disagreements over
the legitimacy of one of the candidates to succeed; disagreements over the process or procedure
of selection and installment; or disagreements over the legitimacy of one or some of the
kingmakers. Chieftaincy conflicts are serious conflicts as control over chieftaincy means control
over land, natural resources, and other properties within the community. Kendie and Akudugu
(2010) observe that most of the chieftaincy and ethnic disputes in Ghana's rural areas are about
access to land and the power that this confers on owners – traditional political power. Others
view it as a defense over the identity of peoples’ lineage and family and therefore see conflicts
over chieftaincy in the light of ethnic boundary maintenance (in the primordial and instrumental
sense) (Gurr, 1993). Gurr argues that identity, especially ethnic identity arising from a
primordial or instrumentalist perspective, is an important motivating factor for people’s
mobilization, and so it is for power and for that matter chieftaincy. People’s contest for
chieftaincy positions, especially in northern Ghana, has been to maintain the status (identity) of
their families and lineage because of the prestige associated with such an office.
Most violent conflicts in Ghana are predominantly chieftaincy-related and are usually
mingled with ethnic issues either within the same ethnic group or between two different ethnic
groups. The northern part of Ghana has particularly witnessed these chieftaincy conflicts with
very violent confrontations that have resulted in loss of lives and destructions of property. In
2002, the king of Dagbon, Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, and 40 of his followers were killed
following fighting with a rival gate, the Abudus, due to long-standing struggles to the Dagbon
skin (Tonah, 2012; Mahama, 2009; Olawale, 2008; Tsikata & Seini, 2004). The Dagbon case is
an intra-ethnic conflict within the same family (Andani and Abudu) over issues of the rotation of
the skin between them. Similarly, Bawku in the Upper East Region has witnessed one of
Ghana’s most devastating inter-ethnic chieftaincy conflicts between the Kusasis and Mamprusis
ethnic groups with uncounted loss of lives and destructions of property (Bukari, 2013; Kendie &
Bukari, 2012; Lund, 2003). On June 19, 2014, the overlord of the Nanung Traditional Area, Naa

Andani Dasana, along with three others, was killed in Bimbilla over an intra-ethnic rival claim to
the skin (Myjoyonline.com).
The causes of chieftaincy conflicts often range from several underlying issues, but most
are basically over the legitimacy of one of the candidates to the skin/stool, the process or
procedure of selection and installment, or the legitimacy of one or some of the kingmakers to do
the selection and installation of chiefs. In areas where the chieftaincy is rotational between gates
such as among the Dagomba and Namumba, conflicts have often arisen over which gate it is to
ascend to the skin. However, several factors tend to exacerbate chieftaincy conflicts. These
include easy access to arms in many parts of Ghana; weakening of and failure to use indigenous
mechanisms in resolving conflicts; and the politicization of chieftaincy conflicts where rivalry to
the skin/stool are fought along political lines mainly, especially between the two major parties in
Ghana, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC) (Anamzoya &
Tonah, 2012; Anamzoya, 2009).
Study Area and Research Methods
The study area, the Bulsa Traditional Area, is located in the north-western part of the
Upper East Region of Ghana. It is called Buluk by the people. It is bordered to the North and
East by the Kassena-Nankana District, to the west by the Sissala District, and to the south by the
West Mamprusi District and Kassena-Nankana East District. The traditional area is made up of
two administrative districts namely Bulsa North and Bulsa South Districts. It covers a total land
area of 2,220km2. Sandema is the seat of the paramountcy making the Sandem Naab head chief
of the Bulsa Traditional Area with the power to install and confer chieftaincy titles on chiefs
from towns like Fumbisi, Gbedema, Chuchuliga, Wiaga, Siniensi, Kanjaga, Doninga, Kadema,
and Uasi (see Figure 1). The area is prominently made of the Bulsa ethnic group who speak a
common language, Buli. According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census of Ghana, the
area has a total population of 92,991 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012).
Data for the paper was taken between August 2013 and February 2014. The paper adopts
a qualitative approach with in-depth focus on the views and perceptions of some of the leaders of
the area through a case study method. The qualitative approach was used both in the data
gathering process and analysis where ethnographic methods such as in-depth interviews (eight),
a group discussion and field observations were applied. For the analysis, the interviews were
transcribed, and a content analysis of the transcribed data was completed. The case study

allowed a detailed and in-depth study of the topic. The respondents were purposively sampled
and interviewed face-to-face in Sandema and Wiaga. They comprised a group interview with the
paramount chief of Buluk and his elders (ten) in Sandema, two opinion leaders, a divisional
chief, one sub chief, two elderly women, and two of the 2012 contestants to the Sandema skin.
The sampling took into consideration knowledge of the respondents on the chieftaincy system in
the area. Additionally, some secondary literature on the Buluk chieftaincy was used for the
analyses. These include media reports, anthropological literature and various research articles as
we will see below.

Figure 1: Map of the Bulsa Traditional Area
Source: Author’s Construct, 2014

Results and Discussion
Chieftaincy in the Bulsa Area
The Bulsa belong to the Mole-Dagomba (a Gur linguistic group) group who are found in
northern Ghana. Much of the history of the Bulsa area is through narratives. The popular
narrative (based on oral history through my interviews) has always been that the Bulsa area was
founded by Atuga who is believed to have been a descendant of the Mamprusi Kingdom (see
also Schott, 2001). Atuga was then a son of the Mamprusi king. The Mamprusi by then already
practiced chieftaincy. The narrative says that following a quarrel with his father the Nayiri,
Atuga set off and finally came to the present day Buluk. When Atuga came he had met people
already present in the area. Following victory in wars and the organizational ability of the Atuga
lineage, the family soon rose to prominence and became the chieftains of the four towns of
Sandema, Wiaga, Siniensi and Kadema which were named after the children of Atuga. An
aspect of the narrative has it that Sandema rose to prominence as the most important town and
seat of the paramountcy following the warrior-like qualities of chiefs of Sandema. Kröger
(2012) observes that records show it was in 1912 that Sandema became the paramountcy.
Kröger (2012) states further that “On April 15, 1912, Ayieta was approved as Paramount Chief
of the ‘Kanjagas’ (Bulsa) by C.H. Armitage, then Chief Commissioner of the Northern
Territories. The relation between Ayieta and the British, at least in the beginning, was not
always without tensions” (p. 48).
The successful defeat of Babatu, a notorious Zambarima slave raider, in 1897 made the
Sandem Naab in competition with Kanjaga from Southern Bulsa, the leading Bulsa chief and the
paramount chief (see also Kröger, 2012). The hierarchical set-up of the chieftaincy in Buluk
(presented in Figure 2 on the next page) shows that the Yeri-nyam who are at the bottom have
the power to select chiefs.
The first three in Figure 2 (paramount, divisional and sub-chiefs) belong to a political
category. They come to office by elections and/or nominations. The last two (elders, in the Buli
meaning of kpaga and Yerinyam) belong to the lineage system. They come to office by their
status of seniority without elections and they have a tremendous religious significance.

Paramount Chief

Sandem Naab
Divisional Chiefs

Sateng Naalima
Sub/Village Chiefs

Kambonaalima
Elders

Nisomba
House Owners

Yeri-Nyam

Figure 2: Hierarchy of the Chieftaincy Set-up of Buluk
Source: Author’s construct, 2014.

Historically, although a number of chiefs of Sandema have always existed, Anankum was
the first chief of Sandema to be documented in the British records. Abil was said to be the first
chief of Sandema, and it is from the Abil lineage that all chiefs of Sandema have emerged.
Contestants for the Sandema chieftaincy therefore all come from Abil-yeri (Abil’s house). After
Abil, many chiefs like Anaguna and Ateba emerged. Anaankum, after his victorious battles
against Babatu, was recognized as the most prominent Bulsa chief, but was never installed as an
official paramount chief. However, written sources of paramount chiefs are: “Ayieta Ananguna,
1905 to 18 May 1912, who was made paramount chief on 23 September 1911; Afoko, 11
December 1912 to 3 March 1927; Akansugaasa (Agaasa), 8 April 1927 to 1931; Azantilow
Ayieta, 16 November 1931 to 14 November 2006” (Kröger, 2012, p.48), and the current chief
Azagsuk Azantilow, from 17 July 2012 to-date.
A unique feature of chieftaincy succession in the Bulsa area is the use of the voting
system which has historically existed over years. Chiefs of Buluk, whether sub-chiefs, divisional
chiefs or the paramount chief (Sandem naab), are voted for by the kingmakers who are the
landlords or house owners (Yeri-nyam). These landlords or house owners (Yeri-nyam) are

traditionally the “indigenous” settlers of the area and are regarded as original owners of the land.
Unlike other northern ethnic groups of Ghana such as the Gonja, Wala, Dagomba, Nanumba, and
Mamprusi, the succession to the skin in Buluk is not run on a gate, rotational or promotional
system, but rather patrilineal family system. With the gate and rotational system, a particular
family known as a gate waits until it is the turn of their gate before ascending to the skin. The
promotional system on the other hand occurs when royals become chiefs of smaller villages and
then move on to a higher chieftaincy position until they move on to contest the paramount chief
position (Anamzoya, 2009).
With the Bulsa system, candidates for the chief must come from the royal house whose
lineage has once been chiefs or contested for a chief’s position before. In the case of Sandema,
the candidates must come from Abil-yeri. The system is open to as many families who qualify
and two or more people could come from the same family to contest. During the election,
contestants for the position of a chief are joined by the kingmakers who line up behind him and
the contestant with the highest number of people behind him is declared the winner. Kröger
(2012) states that:
The free election of a Bulsa Paramount Chief, however, is a novelty because all of
Azantilow’s predecessors, in spite of superficial formal election rituals, were practically
appointed and installed by the British. In other words, the British would have never
allowed somebody who had disobeyed their orders before or with whom a successful cooperation could not be expected to become a chief. (p. 48)
Kröger’s statement is important for our understanding of the interference of the British
colonialists in the chieftaincy system. Despite the fact that the people elected their chiefs, the
British decision and recognition were important in one becoming a chief. My interview
informants claimed that election had always been a prominent feature of the succession to the
chieftaincy of the Buluk and was done then in the same fashion as it exists today. An elderly
member of the Sandema royal family remarked that:
For us Bulsa, the general belief has been that it is only the house owners or landlords who
choose a chief. This has long been the tradition since our forebears founded this land.
Although the British colonial masters have always had interest in who becomes a chief of
Sandema, it was the people who elected and installed their chiefs. The British Colonial

Masters will always come to ask if the people have elected their chiefs before recognizing
whoever was elected. In fact, during the election of Naab Afoko on 11 December, 1912,
disputes over his elections with Ayiparuk led to the latter being put in prison in Navrongo
by the British. Although there was interference from the British, the base line is that there
was an election. For the Bulsa, when a person is not elected by the people as a chief,
getting support to rule was and is still difficult. (Interview with an elder of Sandema
Royal Family, August 2013, Sandema)
The elder’s quote above reiterates the fact that democratic tenants have been part of
African traditional administrative systems as Graeber (2004), Danquah (1961), and CaselyHayford (1903) have observed. Two or more candidates are allowed to form alliances in the
process of voting. In the 2012 contest, the Afoko candidate (Amoak Afoko) moved with his
voters to join that of Atiteng Azantilow. The Bulsa maintain that the voting system has been an
integral part of the succession to the skin, and even predates colonialism and the introduction of
modern elections in Ghana. The arguments put forward for the use of the voting system, first of
all, give legitimacy to chiefs. This enables chiefs to get the support of the people in ruling.
Besides, it makes the people part of the decision making and ruling process in the area. A subchief sums it up as: “The people will then take ownership of their chieftaincy” (Interview with
elder of Sub-chief, December 2013, Sandema).
One of the divisional chiefs also notes that the voting system in the chieftaincy
succession of the Buluk area also allows for transparency and helps to prevent conflicts or
disagreements over the election of chiefs. Thus the voting system forms part of the traditional
decision making process.
Conflicts/Disputes in the Selection of Chiefs
A question may be asked: “Is it indeed the case that the voting system in the area
prevents conflicts?” Conflicts over chieftaincy to the skin in Buluk have always existed. The
cause of these conflicts has not been because of the legitimacy of a particular candidate to the
skin, but disputes over the kingmakers and also over voting irregularities. Another elderly
member of the Sandema royal family notes that:
Disputes and conflicts have always emerged in the process of selecting chiefs, but they
are quickly resolved and all challenges to the elected chief are dropped. It happened

during the election of Afoko and Azantilow, but these disputes were resolved. Kanjaga
and Chuchuliga had conflicts in the selection of the chiefs, but Kanjaga was finally
resolved. Although the case of Chuchuliga is still contentious, it is almost settled. Most
disputes arise over procedures with regard to the election or perceived mal-voting by one
of the candidates. (Interview with elder of Sandema Royal Family, August 2013,
Sandema)

Thus it remains obvious that the voting system does not in itself prevent disputes in the
election of chiefs. The informant above stated that the election of Naab Afoko on 11 December,
1912, was marked by disputes. One of the contestants, Ayiparuk, felt that Afoko’s election was
supposedly manipulated by the British. Ayiparuk then challenged the election resulting in his
incarceration at the Navrongo Prisons by the British. Again, Amaama challenged the November
16, 1931, election of Azantilow Ayieta after he (Amaama) felt that he should have been elected
chief instead of Azantilow Ayieta. Amaama is also believed to have opposed the election
because of perceived interference from the British colonial masters.
A chieftaincy dispute has also occurred in Chuchuliga. The Chuchuliga conflict has been
the most pronounced in the history of Buluk. Kröger (2012) reports that the conflict arose after
the death of Allan Asangalisa and a new chief was to be enskinned (installed). Accordingly, the
cause of the dispute was whether the new chief was to be elected in Sandema under the
supervision of the Sandem Naab (Ayieta Azantilow), as was the case with all divisional chiefs,
or whether he should be elected in Chuchuliga. Francis Asangalisa, one of the contestants,
refused to go to Sandema for the election and Joseph Adakula Amaachanan was subsequently
elected and installed as Chuchuliga Naab by the Sandem Naab. Francis Asangalisa was also
enskinned by kingmakers in Chuchuliga in August 1995. This led to violent confrontations
between supporters of the two candidates and a legal battle between the Sandem Naab and
Francis Asangalisa. Adakula Amaachanan later abdicated and made peace with Francis
Asangalisa in July 2006 making Francis Asangalisa the chief (Kröger, 2012). The case of
Chuchuliga is still pending at the Upper East Regional House of Chiefs although Francis
Asangalisa performs duties as chief of the area. The Asangalisa family has always maintained
that chiefs of Chuchuliga are elected by the kingmakers in Chuchuliga, and not in Sandema.

The current conflict took place after the death of Azantilow Ayieta in 2006 between the
Afoko family and the children of Azantilow. Following the death of Naab Ayieta Azantilow on
14 November, 2006, controversy arose first of all over who has the right to be the regent before
the funeral of Naab Ayieta Azantilow was performed and the election of a substantive Sandem
Naab. Alexis Tampuri Azantilow, surviving eldest son of Naab, Ayiety Azantilow, was made a
regent (Nansuik Naab). This was opposed by the Afoko family who argues that the position of
NansuikNaab was alien to the traditions of Buluk and that it was the eldest member of the royal
family, Francis Afoko Asiaknab, who should preside over the area until a substantive chief was
elected. Another issue was with the disregard for Buluk tradition that chiefs are buried
immediately after they are dead. The Afoko family accused Azantilow’s children of breaking
that tradition by delaying the burial of the chief and carrying the body of the late chief to the
Bolgatanga Mortuary.
Consequently, the Afoko family took these issues to court, and an injunction was placed
on the movement of the body as well as the funeral. The children of Azantilow forcefully took
the body out of the mortuary and took the corpse for burial on 27 January, 2007, whilst the court
was yet to take a decision on the matter. It is worth noting that all these disputes were actually
geared towards the succession to the Sandem skin – the interest of both factions to gain control
of the skin. A potential violent conflict was soon to break out between the two factions, but the
Ghanaian state deployed security personnel to the area. After five years of conflict and
stalemate, the two factions agreed to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and the final funeral
rites of the late chief were performed to pave way for the election of a substantive chief. This
was due to negotiations from elders, prominent citizens of the area, and divisional chiefs who
engaged the factions in mediation.
Another dispute arose between two sons of Azantilow, Azagsuk Azantilow, and Atiteng
Azantilow as to who really won the contest for the chieftaincy during the election of the new
Sandem Naab on 17 July, 2012, and the subsequent unofficial declaration of Azagsuk Azantilow
as the new chief. The Sandem skin was contested for by twelve candidates from each of the
royal families of Abil-Yeri with the main contenders being Azagsuk Azantilow and Atiteng
Azantilow. While counting of Azagsuk’s votes was still going on, his supporters concluded his
votes were overwhelmingly greater than Atiteng’s votes, declared him the winner, and carried
him home. This was challenged by Atiteng Azantilow who claimed that during the counting,

people who were not kingmakers got counted by joining the rightful kingmakers who stood
behind Azagsuk Azantilow, and swelled his numbers. Accordingly, Atiteng Azantilow filed a
lawsuit challenging the election of Azagsuk Azantilow.
However, through effective negotiation by the divisional chiefs of the area, the factions
agreed to resolve their differences, and Atiteng Azantilow withdrew his challenge and
recognized the election of Azagsuk Azantilow as the new Sandem Naab. The divisional chiefs
met both contestants separately after which they brought them together to mediate for the case to
be dropped. Consequently, on 12 December, 2013, all the factions came together at a durbar
(public gathering) of chiefs and people in Sandema to coronate Naab Azagsuk Azantilow as
Sandem Naab ending the year-long conflict. In all these conflicts over the succession, there is an
interlocking of power-play and power relations where individuals and groups want to assert their
right to the occupancy of traditional power. This is done through aligning with “other powers
that be” to get access to the skin. These “powers that be” include political/governmental
officials, opinion leaders and important elders. Some actors use the chieftaincy disputes to assert
and enhance their power during the process of negotiation and consensus building, as we can see
from the above narratives.
Consensus and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts
In all the conflicts to the Buluk skin, unlike places like the Dagbon, Ga, and Bimbila
chieftaincy conflicts, deaths and open fighting are always absent. There is consensus at the end
and the conflicts are resolved. Reasons for this according to informants for this study include the
fact that the contest is always between one “big family” and not gates. Unlike the gate system,
the Buluk chieftaincy system is what Azagsuk Azantilow called, “A contest of a blood family
and not one of outsiders” (Interview with Naab Azagsuk Azantilow September 2013).
The Abil-Yeri clan for instance considers all the houses qualified to contest the skin as a
family made of different blood brothers. A sub-chief argues that:
Looking at Afoko and Ayiparuk who disputed, the two were blood brothers. It is same
with Azantilow and Amaama and now Azagsuk and Atiteng. So how long can blood
brothers fight without reconciling? Hence, the peaceful nature of the contests. (Interview
Sub-chief, December 2013, Sandema)

Besides, the influence, character, and role of Ayieta Azantilow have helped Buluk to
survive and remained peaceful (Awedoba, 2009). According to Awedoba, Azantilow having
reigned for seventy five years, was very “powerful” and united the entire area under Sandema.
Another reason argued for the peaceful nature of the area is the strict adherence to laid-down
tradition and the use of traditional methods of dispute resolution, as well as the willingness of the
winner to reach out to the losers. Through the use of the rites of the earth cult and negotiation by
elders, conflicts are settled and the disputants who challenge the election agree to peaceful
resolution of the conflicts. As Kirby (2006) maintains, rituals of the earth cult in most ethnic
groups in Northern Ghana such as sacrifices, prayers and appeasing ancestral spirits, play
important roles in conflict resolution and reconciliation. Another sub-chief notes that:
Settling chieftaincy conflicts among the Bulsa has always been historical and peaceful.
Both challenges and disputes to the election of Naab Afoko and Naab Azantilow were
peacefully resolved. The most recent conflicts between the Afoko family and Azantilow
family were successfully resolved using laid down traditions of the rites of the earth cult.
All the factions in the conflict and elders by Buluk tradition came together to roast a fowl
and ate together which symbolically represents the end to the conflict. What this ritual
does is to commit ourselves before our ancestors and gods that we will no longer be in
conflict and that settles the dispute. (Interview with Sub-chief, January 2014, Sandema)

Thus, the reconciliation process to conflicts has always involved the resort to tradition. It
is important to state that it is not just the voting system that allows for peace and consensus, but
the mutual and supportive interaction of the traditional structures, actors, and the minority who

agree to compromise and accept the decision of the majority—although they are not compelled
to do so (Graeber, 2004).
Consensus-based Democracy in the Buluk Chieftaincy System
The system of selecting chiefs in Buluk is based on a consensus-based traditional
democracy in which a “voting system” is used, but is unlike the western system of voting in
which every citizen of voting age takes part. Unlike western direct democracy, consensus in
traditional settings like Buluk is what Graeber (2004) calls a “consensus process” where the point
is to allow a group to decide on a common course of action (p. 35). The use of the election
system in selecting and installing chiefs in Buluk, where a group of comparatively ordinary

people (landlords) are the kingmakers, is unique in the chieftaincy institution in Ghana. In many
parts of Ghana, the kingmakers are a group of chiefly persons who belong to the aristocratic
class of society. Hinging on these arguments, since the election of chiefs in the Bulsa area
follows what the people referred to as “who has the majority votes of landlords,” it can well be
termed a democratic chieftaincy system. Thus democracy in this sense is consensus-based
decision-making in which people (the landlords) make decisions for the collective good, and
accept someone as chief of the area for the peace of the area.
Besides, the consensus in Buluk is based on decision-making, where the “minority is not
compelled to agree with a majority decision—because there is no person or institution in Buluk
with a monopoly of coercive force, or the state has nothing to do with the chieftaincy decisionmaking,” as Ghana’s 1992 Constitution forbids state inference in chieftaincy matters (Graeber,
2004, p.89). This consensus-based traditional democracy in the Buluk chieftaincy system is
competitive, participatory, and allows for compromises. (Azagsuk Azantilow succinctly put it
as: “We disagree to agree…our contest is always hotly done but we will always come to a
compromise in the end…” (Interview with Naab Azagsuk Azantilow and his elders, September
2013, Sandema).
In many of the elections of chiefs to the Buluk skin, opponents of the winning chief have
often challenged the process of election as being manipulative and procedurally wrong. In the
election of Naab Afoko and Naab Azantilow, the accusation was about the supposed
manipulation of the electoral process by the British colonialists. The recent conflict in 2012 was
marred by similar challenges of mal-voting and rejection of the election by Atiteng Azantilow.
In the process, some have argued for an introduction of modern reforms like secret voting and
registration of all kingmakers with voter cards to avoid the problems of perceived manipulation
and mal-voting. This suggestion was already rejected by a section of the elders and some of the
candidates during the 2012 election of a chief. They argue that introduction of such reforms will
tend to adulterate and undermine the long-held traditions of the people.
Similarly, it is argued that the ability of the area to quickly resolve conflicts when they
arise in the process of selecting chiefs is a unique democratic feature of chieftaincy in Ghana.
Consensus-building and conflict resolution is important in a democracy because it brings an end
to a conflict and prevents it from escalating into violence. In most parts of northern Ghana,
chieftaincy conflicts that have arisen over succession to the skin have become protracted, violent,

and remain largely unresolved. The Bawku and Dagbon chieftaincy conflicts have both
remained unresolved for over five decades. The effective use of traditional conflict resolution
methods in the case of Buluk is important in helping build a resilient chieftaincy system. This is
how a sound democracy operates. However, questions are being asked as to whether all the
other towns under the Sandema paramountcy will continue to hold as they have always
demanded their own paramountcy status.
The power and influence of Naab Ayieta Azantilow to hold the unity of all towns within
the paramountcy is yet to be tested after his death. Kröger (2012) reveals that in the past, chiefs
of Kanjaga have attempted several times to secede from the Sandema paramountcy, but have
always failed. Awedoba (2009) equally postulates that the other towns like Wiaga, Fumbisi,
Kadema, Uasi, Kanjaga, and Gbedema which are of comparable status to Sandema may not
accept their current subordinate status. And the division of the traditional area into two districts
which makes some towns administratively independent of Sandema could further threaten the
unity of the traditional area. In the Feok festival (annual festival of the area) of December 2013,
many of the towns already did not take part in the activities in Sandema and seemed to have
organized their own festivals. This remains the time to test the resilience of the consensus-based
democratic succession in the area since threats of secession from the paramountcy may be
obvious soon.
Is the Buluk Case a Model for Chieftaincy Succession in Ghana?
Despite the problems with the voting system, in which candidates who lose the elections
are always aggrieved because they feel there was some mal-voting in the system, the consensusbased democratic chieftaincy system in the Bulsa Traditional Area has helped to hold the area
together in comparison to other areas in northern Ghana. A question worth asking is whether the
voting system in the Bulsa Traditional Area could be a model for chieftaincy succession in other
parts of Ghana. On a very positive note, it will be good if a democratic election system is
adopted in the elections of chiefs in Ghana, even if it is an Electoral College System. This will
help minimize many chieftaincy disputes by making the system acceptable to all parties in the
contest. In this case, it can be fashioned such that the kingmakers, even if they are only two,
vote to select the chief. The National and Regional Houses of Chiefs become the electoral
bodies responsible for codifying laws, regulations, and supervising the voting and selection
process.

In the case of the Bulsa Traditional Area, the system has well been used over a century
and its usefulness is evident in the effective way it helps to prevent violent conflicts in the area.
On the other hand, will the election system if applied in all areas in Ghana conform to the
tradition and customs of these areas in the selection of chiefs? Chieftaincy is tradition that
conforms to the customs of a particular area and every area is governed by its own traditions,
which are respected and have remained in use for centuries. Besides, every traditional area is
unique in its system of selecting and installing chiefs. These traditions cannot just be changed on
the basis of what patterns exist in a particular area. The universal acceptability of this model
throughout Ghana could therefore be problematic because of the local nature of chieftaincy – it is
practiced differently than most models.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine how conflict and consensus are handled in the
chieftaincy succession system of the Bulsa Traditional area of Ghana. The paper argued that
despite conflicts that emerge in the succession of chiefs in the area, a consensus-based
democracy and consensus decision-making have helped to maintain peace and avoid violence,
unlike other areas in Ghana where succession disputes have resulted in violent conflicts. The
Buluk chieftaincy system also clearly demonstrates that the traditions of Africa have many
democratic elements including voting for leaders. The case of voting for chiefs Buluk was
practiced before colonialism and has continued till date. Thus, the paper argues that consensusbased democracy and consensus decision of traditional institutions like that of Buluk help in
conflict resolution.
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